This study argues that developed capital markets, through their monitoring and disciplining role, can significantly influence innovation and economic growth. Specifically, it examines how strong corporate governance proxied by the threat of hostile takeovers affects innovation. It uses a panel of 13,339 firms over the 1976-2000 period, patents and patent citations to measure the quantity and quality of innovation, and the enactment of state antitakeover laws as an exogenous decrease in the threat of hostile takeovers. It finds a decline in innovation for firms incorporated in states that pass antitakeover laws relative to firms incorporated in states that do not. Most of the impact of antitakeover laws on innovation occurs two or more years after they
are enacted, indicating a causal effect. The negative effect of antitakeover laws is mitigated by the presence of alternative governance mechanisms such as large shareholders, pension fund ownership, financial leverage, and product market competition.
"Labor and Corporate Governance: International Evidence from Restructuring Decisions" (with E.
Han Kim, Journal of Finance, February 2009, 64:1) , Presented at the Annual Corporate Governance Conference, Zurich, Switzerland 2006, and at the Harvard Corporate Governance Conference, Cambridge, MA, 2006 Our results highlight the importance of interaction among management, labor, and investors in shaping corporate governance. We find that strong union laws protect not only workers but also underperforming managers. Weak investor protection combined with strong union laws are conducive to worker-management alliances, wherein poorly performing firms sell assets to prevent large scale layoffs, garnering worker support to retain management. Asset sales in weak investor protection countries lead to further deteriorating performance, whereas in strong investor protection countries they improve performance and lead to more layoffs. Strong union laws are less effective in preventing layoffs when financial leverage is high. We hypothesize that public firms that create novel innovations rely more on arm's length financing (equity and public debt) than on relationship based bank financing. A primary reason is that banks, unable to evaluate novel technologies, will tend to discourage investing in innovative projects and be more prone to shut down ones that are ongoing. Using a large panel of US companies from 1974-2000, we find that consistent with our predictions, firms that rely more on arm's length financing have a larger number of patents and these patents are more significant in terms of influencing subsequent patents. We confirm our findings by showing a significant increase in innovative activity of firms following a large infusion of arm's length financing and no such pattern after a similar infusion of bank loans. Creating novel innovations leads to a significantly higher firm value and suggests that firms would rationally take into account the potential impact of innovative activity when making their financing choices. Finally, we use an IV approach to ameliorate endogeneity concerns and demonstrate that our findings are driven primarily by innovative firms choosing their financing arrangements.
"Corporate governance, non-financial stakeholders and innovation: Evidence from a natural experiment" (prepared for submission to the Journal of Finance, Presented at the Pacific Northwest Finance Conference, Seattle, WA, 2008) How do opportunistic managers balance the interests of shareholders and non-financial stakeholders? Two theoretical views suggest that managers care about non-financial stakeholders either to enhance their private benefits, or to improve stakeholder incentives and thus to increase productivity and firm value. I test these theories by using data on stakeholder-friendly policies, such as giving to charities, and caring about minorities, employees, customers, and the environment. To resolve the endogenous relation between stakeholder friendly policies on the one hand, and innovation and firm value on the other, I use the enactment of Constituency Laws, which represent an exogenous variation in state legislation that increased the power of non-financial stakeholders. I also use the enactment of antitakeover laws to capture the exogenous decrease in the strength of corporate governance. I find that the greatest increase in the number of stakeholder-friendly policies occurs when corporate governance is weak and stakeholders are strong. In this case, I also find that firms increase their financial leverage, supporting the theory that leverage is used as a bargaining tool against powerful stakeholders. I also find that when governance is weak and stakeholders are strong, managers overinvest in stakeholder friendly policies that reduce innovation and firm value. When both shareholders and stakeholders are strong however, managers judiciously invest in stakeholder policies that increase innovation and firm value. These findings have implications for the theory and purpose of the firm.
"Does government borrowing crowd out corporate innovation" (in progress, with Amit Seru)
We investigate whether government borrowing can crowd out private borrowing, and if there are real implications of crowding out. We find that in periods of increased government borrowing, large established companies are not affected, but smaller growing companies have greater difficulties in raising public debt financing. We control for endogeneity and contemporaneous economy shocks. We find that the innovative activity of a control group 1 of stronger firms -that are able to issue longer-maturity debt is not affected much. Similarly, the innovative activity of a control group 2 of firms with no access to public debt markets is also not significantly affected. On the other hand, the innovative activity of the treatment group of smaller growing firms with short-term public debt is affected the most.
"Why do venture capitalists invest in environmentally friendly entrepreneurs" (in progress)
This project investigates the motivation of venture capitalists to invest in environmentally friendly ventures. On the one hand, venture capitalists could be motivated by the possibility of greater profit than otherwise similar projects that are not environmentally friendly because of the possibility of greater demand from environmentally conscious customers, or more favorable attitude to the project from the government and the local community. On the other hand, venture capitalists may invest in such projects to enhance their personal satisfaction and popularity, even though the projects are less profitable than otherwise similar projects. The second explanation suggests an agency problem between investors in the venture capital fund and the fund manager, whose interests don't necessarily coincide with the interests of the investors. Although each of these two explanations can be present at the same time, I investigate which one dominates the motivation of the venture capitalist. I obtain both publicly available and hand-collected data to conduct my tests. To test for the presence of agency problems I create a measure of the governance of the venture capital fund. Since the results can be contaminated by endogeneity problems stemming from the direction of causality between fund performance and investing in environmentally friendly projects, I use an exogenous variation in state-level environmentally friendly regulation, to provide identification for my tests.
The results have implications for the theory of entrepreneurship and venture capital financing. September 2011-present) 
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